Legal Corner

ADA
Boot requirement essential function of job

In Radenbaugh v. U.S. Steel Clairton Works, a chemical analyst could not find properly fitting metatarsal boots, which were required at the plant, because she had a square-shaped fifth metatarsal. She resigned as part of a workers' compensation settlement and then sued under the ADA arguing the company failed to accommodate her disability when it required her to wear ANSI-certified boots.

The accommodation she sought was custom-made ANSI-certified footwear, but the company said that a manufacturer could not be found to make the boots. Thus, the court found that she "failed to make her facial showing that her requested accommodation of custom-made footwear was possible." Since she was unable to comply with the safety boot requirement, she could not perform the essential functions of her job, and therefore, is not a qualified individual for ADA purposes.

Workers Compensation
Employer must face civil liability for workplace shooting - Georgia

In Simmons v. Solo Cup Operating Corp., the Court of Appeals reversed an earlier court ruling that said exclusive remedy barred a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the family of a man, Taurus Andrews, who was shot by a coworker at a Solo Cup factory. The deceased worker had found a bag containing several identification cards in a men's restroom and turned it over to his supervisor. When another supervisor turned the bag over to the employee it belonged to, the employee discovered $400 was missing and he confronted Andrews. Unconvinced by Andrew's denial, he shot and killed him.

Andrew's mother filed a wrongful death suit against the company for negligent hiring and failing to keep the premises safe. The company argued exclusive remedy barred the civil case and the trial court agreed. However, the Appeals Court reversed, noting that although turning in the bag was required by the company's policies, such actions do not usually result in violence. The shooting was a result of a willful act by a third person directed against an employee for personal reasons - the alleged theft of $400. The theft was unrelated to work performance.

Denial of presumption applicability reversed - Minnesota

In Drusch v. City of Howard Lake Fire Department, the family of a volunteer firefighter who sustained coronary sclerosis, which led to his death, sought dependency benefits. The presumption statute provides that, under certain conditions, coronary sclerosis, where sustained by an active-duty firefighter, is presumed to be an occupational disease sustained due to the nature of the employment. A compensation judge held that the statutory presumption was inapplicable because the firefighter had not undergone a physical examination at the time of hire, which negated the evidence of coronary sclerosis relationship to employment.

The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals disagreed, noting the family provided evidence the firefighter had undergone numerous physical examinations after being hired, which showed normal cardiac health, making it likely that the employee was free of the disease. The compensation judge's denial of petitioner's claim for dependency benefits is reversed and the matter is remanded for findings on whether the self-insured employer has rebutted the statutory presumption.

High court addresses legal standard for medical causation - Nebraska

In Prinz v. Omaha Operations LLC, a housekeeper who worked for a rehabilitation facility was required to wear an N95 mask during the pandemic. The facility had a sterilizer machine so masks could be reused. When she took one from the machine, she felt a burning sensation, had difficulty breathing, and was taken by ambulance to the hospital. She sought treatment with a family doctor as well as a pulmonologist, who diagnosed her with "moderate persistent asthma" and she filed a comp claim.

The facility denied the claim, pointing out that an expert testified the housekeeper's injury was "associated" with the mask, which was insufficient to establish a causal connection between a work accident and the injury. When the Workers' Compensation Court awarded benefits, the facility appealed to the Supreme Court.

A medical causation opinion from a physician must be reasonably definite and certain to establish the crucial causal link between the injuries and the accident occurring in the course and scope of employment. The court has found that opinions using phrases like "may be", "possibly", "could be" etc. do not have the certainty to support an award. The high court upheld the award, noting the expert articulated that his opinion was based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty and that the employer offered no alternative explanation for the housekeeper's onset of asthma.

Intoxicated worker gets comp for fall from ladder - New York

In a precedent-setting case, Lujan-Espinzo v. Electrical Illuminations by Arnold Inc., an appeals court ruled that a worker who was severely intoxicated when he fell eight feet off a ladder is eligible for workers comp benefits because it's possible other factors contributed to the accident. Although there is a presumption of compensability without regard to fault as a cause of the injury, the statute makes the exception "...when the injury has been solely occasioned by intoxication from alcohol."

The decision states, "As found by the Board, although intoxication may have contributed to the accident, the record reflects that claimant's 'fall can also be attributed to the absence of another employee holding the ladder, a simple misjudgment of footing, or the lack of a safety railing on an elevated surface or the inherent risk of working at height."'

Out of state fun ATV trip injury compensable - Pennsylvania

In Power Home Remodeling, Inc. v. Hess, a home improvement company's vice president of operations took a few employees on an ATV trip in West Virginia. His job involved identifying and recruiting current employees for leadership positions within the company and employees often were taken on trips or to sporting events. Since he had forgotten his business credit card, he used his personal card and planned to request reimbursement. He filed a comp claim after he was seriously injured and paralyzed during the trip.

The company denied the claim noting, among other things, that it took place outside the workspace and he had used his credit card. The Commonwealth Court disagreed, stating an injury can be compensable when it occurs while the employee is furthering the business or affairs of his employer, regardless of the location of the injury. The company had a culture of cultivating employees for leadership with entertaining trips and events and carrying out that policy was part of the VP's job.

Light duty assignment does not have to accommodate injured worker's driving restrictions - Tennessee

In Bibiane Francoeur v. Amerimed Medical Solutions, LLC., the Appeals Board ruled the employer of an injured worker who had driving restrictions is not responsible for her inability to drive to and from her light-duty return-to-work assignment. The worker was injured when a client in an electric wheelchair pushed her into a wall and ran over her feet causing crushing injuries and complex regional pain syndrome.

The employer offered a light-duty position that complied with all work-related restrictions, but the employee declined to accept because she couldn't get to and from work due to the no-driving restriction. In response, the employer terminated temporary disability benefits, asserting it had offered the employee a reasonable light duty position that complied with all work-related restrictions, and it had no legal obligation to get the employee to and from work.

Although the trial court reinstated the benefits, finding that she could not get to work, the Appeals Board reversed. It noted that while employers must make reasonable efforts to accommodate restrictions when offering light-duty work, there is no statutory obligation for an employer to provide transportation for an employee unable to drive due to work-related injuries, unless driving is an essential function of the job. It noted the plethora of case law indicating that an employee's commute is generally not within the course of employment. Therefore, "...we cannot in the absence of a specific statutory or regulatory mandate, impose such an obligation on employers."